On the Wrongfulness of abortion

  • Gustavo Arosemena Universidad de Maastricht
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31207/ih.v6i0.141
Keywords: Bioethics, Rights, Liberalism, Human Rights, Public Reason

Abstract

Abortion is seen as an immoral and unjust act by many. Nonetheless these views are under pressure to conform to the learned opinion on abortion. A variety of prestigious in the field of applied ethics support abortion in one way or another. And it is a dogma of modern liberalism that even if one is personally opposed to abortion, one must accept the neutral solution of its public permissibility. The present article defends the thesis that abortion is immoral and unjust against these contentions. With regards to the moral status of abortion, it argues that the prohibition of abortion is off a piece with the prohibition of killing generally, which is characterized by protecting all human beings equally. With regards to the compatibility of abortion permissibility with liberalism, the article argues that such a compromise is not neutral, but heavily rigged in favor of the interests and world-views of abortion proponents.

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Author Biography

Gustavo Arosemena, Universidad de Maastricht

Doctor en Derecho (PhD) por la Universidad de Maastricht. Master en Leyes (LLM) por la Universidad de Utrecht y la Universidad de Texas en Austin. Licenciado en Derecho (Abogado de los Tribunales de la República del Ecuador) por la Universidad Católica de Santiago de Guayaquil.

Autor de varias publicaciones internacionales bajo procedimiento de revisión por pares que incluyen:

Arosemena, G. (2014). Retrieving the Differences: the Distinctiveness of the Welfare Aspect of Human Rights from the Perspective of Judicial Protection. Human Rights Review, 1-17.

Arosemena, G. (2014). Rights, scarcity, and justice: an analytical inquiry into the adjudication of the welfare aspects of human rights (Antwerp: Intersentia 2014).

Arosemena, G. (2013). Conflicts of rights in international human rights: a meta-rule analysis. Global Constitutionalism, 2(01), 6-36.

Actualmente es docente en la facultad de derecho de la Universidad de Maastricht.

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Published
2017-07-25
How to Cite
Arosemena, G. (2017). On the Wrongfulness of abortion. Ius Humani. Law Journal, 6, 155-172. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31207/ih.v6i0.141
Issue
Vol 6 (2017)
Section
Papers
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